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KEYNOTE: FAIR USE: THREAT OR
THREATENED?
Wendy J. Gordont
Thank you for inviting me to address the Symposium. It is an
honor to participate in the exchange of such interesting and informed
views, and to be back at Case.
The original title for my talk had been Warring Frameworks for
Fair Use. I had intended to discuss two interpretations of market
failure analysis, and to suggest how resolving the conflict between
those warring frameworks might resolve a variety of fair use issues.
But then it struck me that this might not be what you, a group
made up of both generalists and specialists, would most want in a
luncheon address. Current debate sparks with claims that the fair use
doctrine is dangerous to the values it supposedly protects, or that the
doctrine is dead. Therefore, if I spent my time on the internal details
of fair use, you might object that I was teaching you to embroider on
the fabric of a burning curtain.
So let us defer discussing those details. My time today might be
most fruitfully spent asking if fair use is a doctrine that indeed endangers its own goals-and if it is not, exploring whether the doctrine
itself is endangered. In the course of my discussion, I will touch on
the fate of Universal City Studios v. Sony, 1 and will try to cast a bit of

t © 2005 by Wendy J Gordon. Copies may be made for noncommercial or teaching use
without permission.
Professor Gordon is Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law. At the time of delivering this speech, Professor Gordon was also a Visiting
Scholar at the Department of Comparative Media Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
She thanks Bob Bone, Jane Ginsburg, Jessica Litman, Mike Meurer and Leo Raskind for
helpful comments. She also thanks her research assistants, particularly Brandon Ress, BU 2005,
and David Segraves, BU 2006.
1 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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light-albeit a light tinged with irony-on Grokster2 and today's debates on secondary liability.
Let me begin with the question, "How might fair use pose a danger
to its own goals?" Fair use is a liberty right. Like the right of selfdefense in the common law, it provides a shield against govemmentimposed liability or punishment. Fair use aims, among other things, to
assist citizens in deploying copyrighted works as part of their own
expressive activities. In particular, it gives freedoms that the market
may be unable to give, 3 or freedoms for which the market is a normatively inappropriate rationing institution. 4 How could a freedomgranting doctrine interfere with liberty?
Two possibilities present themselves. First, the presence of fair
use might enable Congress to enact broader swaths of exclusivity than
it might otherwise adopt. Second, the existence of fair use might enable judges to validate Congressional schemes that they might otherwise strike down, and might confuse judges into giving short shrift to
defendants' expressive claims that do not take classic fair-use forms.
Thus, claims that the doctrine is dangerous could have both a legislative and a judicial dimension.
In the legislative domain, conceivably fair use is a false promise
that keeps the public from demanding, or Congress from providing,
limits on copyright. Perhaps without fair use, the populace would
more vigorously demand a secure free space for ideas, facts and other
public domain material, 5 or a broad set of exemptions or compulsory
licenses that in their specificity might be more capable of resisting
"chilling effect" than fair use itself. Fair use indeed has weaknesses.
Its case-by-case nature can frustrate desires for predictability, and
while winning a case on fair use grounds can give the defendant an
award of attorneys' fees, 6 such a result is not guaranteed. Moreover,
all Circuits might not agree that a charge of criminal copyright in-

2

MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (granting certiorari).
See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era
of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTEL. PROP. L. 1 (1997); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betama.x Case and its Predecessors,
82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). As both articles emphasize, the market fails to facilitate socially desirable uses in many circumstances, not limited to occasions where transaction costs
block any market at all from forming.
4 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 13 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 149 (2003).
5 See Jessica Litman, Copyright as Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
185, 205 (1992) (criticizing "common wisdom" that might persuade the public to tolerate unwise copyright expansion, including the notion that "[ w]e do not have to worry about the use of
copyright to impede the dissemination of ideas and information, it is said, because fair use is
there to privilege such uses").
6 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004).
,

3
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fringement can be defeated by defendants who possess a good faith
belief that their behavior constituted fair use. 7 In these and other
ways, fair use is less powerful than one might hope.
Further, one does see hints in Congressional debates that reliance
on the supposed power of fair use sometimes hides the urgency of
otherwise exigent policy pressures. Matthew Sag goes so far as to
speculate that it is the existence of fair use that "enabled" the broadening of copyright in the 1976 Copyright Act. 8
On the judicial front, the danger that fair use purportedly poses is
also linked to the notion that the fair use doctrine distracts attention.
However, the argument about how judges are dangerously distracted
is subtly different from the argument about how Congress is distracted, because the judicial claim does not rest on the notion of false
promise. Instead, it rests on the notion of a false distinction: that the
fair use doctrine is encouraging judges to draw a false line between
socially desirable speech on the one hand, and exact copying on the
other.
One scholar I associate with that view is Rebecca Tushnet. She recently wrote a thoughtful and powerful essay subtitled How Fair Use
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It. 9 She argues that during the last few decades, fair use has become so linked
with the notion of "transformative use" that the doctrine has shut its
doors to virtually any nontransformative copying. 10 Further, she argues, fair use is so tied up with free speech that when copyright courts

7 Thus, Lydia Loren writes that, "What several sources describe as the majority view
holds that showing criminal willfulness requires proof of a 'voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty.' Yet even with this majority view, the cases discussing criminal willfulness
are less than satisfactory in their analysis.'' Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodijication,
Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the
the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 877-78 (1999). One case that Professor
Loren singles out as showing more thoughtful analysis is United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp.
I 046, 1048 (D. Neb. 1991) (acquitting defendant on the ground that he possessed an honest
belief that his acts were fair use).
8 Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright's Fair Use
Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=694004#PaperDownload. Thus, Professor
Sag writes, "From its inception, the fair use doctrine has facilitated the expansion of copyright
by providing a flexible limiting principle that defines the outer limits of the copyright owners'
rights." Id. at 25 (footnote omitted). He notes, "One implication of fair use's structural role is
that it advantages copyright owners as a class." Id. at 27. Note that Professor Sag is not hostile
to fair use.
9 Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
10 Although Professor Tushnet acknowledges that cases exist where fair use treatment is
awarded to defendants engaged in exact copying, she minimizes the importance of such precedent by noting that the courts involved often stretch to characterize the copying as transformative. Id. at 555-56.
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indulge this purported disdain for nontransforrnational copying, it
encourages a distortion of First Amendment doctrine as well. 11
Professor Tushnet is right to praise nontransforrnative copying.
Exact copying is a central mode of learning, 12 and often has crucial
First Amendment importance. Consider, for example, the battles over
children reciting the Pledge of Allegiance or reciting prayers in
school; if these acts of mere repetition were not deeply expressive,
people would not so passionately care about the outcomes.
So Professor Tushnet rightly emphasizes how important it can be
for us all to speak others' words in addition to our own. 13 But she
goes further: she is concerned that judges, like Justice Ginsburg in
Eldred, 14 miss this importance when copyright is in front of them,
because fair use somehow crosses their conceptual wires. 15
These, then, are two potential claims about the dangers of fair use:
1) that fair use makes it harder to convince Congress that copyright
needs more explicit limits, and 2) that fair use makes it harder to get
judges to see free speech issues clearly. Are such dangers real? I'll
respond in a moment. But first, let me describe a much more common claim, that fair use is dead.
The claim that fair use is dead tends to take two forrns-a pair of
competing epitaphs. One putative tombstone reads, "Here Lies Fair
Use, Done in by the DMCA." The other tombstone says, "Killed by
Contract."
First, what's meant by the claim that fair use is "Done in by the
DMCA ?" The DMCA, of course, is the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act. 16 The DMCA makes it unlawful to bypass encryption that encases materials that are-even in small part--copyrighted. 17 The
DMCA is usually seen as providing no exception for bypassing technological access controls to make a fair use. 18 Let me give an example
of how this would work.
Id. at 548.
"[l]f man has any 'natural' rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his
fellows ... Education, after all, proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and 'progress,' if it is not
entirely an illusion, depends on generous indulgence of copying." BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT at 2 ( 1967).
13 Professor Tushnet rightly argues that "identification with another's words" can be "as
valuable [and] authentic as disagreement." Tushnet, supra note 9, at 586.
14 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
15 Note the second-class treatment that Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Eldred gives the free
speech interests of people who make "other people's speeches." Id. (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to copyright term extension) as discussed in Tushnet, supra note 9, at 561-64.
16 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
u.s.c. (1998)).
11 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(A) (2000).
18 This is the usual interpretation of Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111
F.Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.2000), ajfd sub nom Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d
11
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Posit a critic who sees a movie she wants to criticize. She plans to
digitally copy a scene, and then apply Photoshop to alter its lighting,
in order to make a point about the film's cinematography. But the
film may be encrypted. If so, the DMCA prohibits the critic from
taking the preliminary steps (decryption) necessary to make a
copy-even though the copying and adaptation could themselves
constitute lawful fair use. The best she can do is play the movie on
her computer or TV screen and aim her video camera at
it-producing a blurry analog version that is unlikely to allow her to
make her cinematographic point. 19 She will be unable to give the
people in her audience the evidence they need to assess her views
about the film.
Providing evidence via quotation is one of the important functions
that the fair use doctrine exists to facilitate. Nevertheless, the DMCA
makes her encryption bypass unlawful, and as a result makes her entitlement to fair use unavailable as a practical matter.
An analogy from the physical world may make it easier to see how
fair use and the DMCA function. Picture a seaside community where
the public beach is largely surrounded by private land. Many jurisdictions would allow beach-goers access through the private land.
Wrote one such court, "Without some means of access the public
right to use the foreshore would be meaningless." 20 Similarly, copyright courts have awarded fair use to persons who, seeking public
domain functional elements, ideas and facts, make copies of copy-

429 (2d Cir. 2001) (fair use not a defense to an anti-trafficking violation under the DMCA).
Other courts might come to different conclusions, however, and even Reimerdes itself need not
be so expansively interpreted. Thus, the Federal Circuit noted, "We do not reach the relationship
between § 107 fair use and violations of§ 1201. The District Court in Reimerdes rejected the
DeCSS defendants' argument that fair use was a necessary defense to § l 20l(a), Reimerdes, 111
F.Supp.2d at 317; because any access enables some fair uses, any act of circumvention would
embody its own defense. We leave open the question as to when § 107 might serve as an affirmative defense to a prima facie violation of§ 1201." Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1200 n.14 (Fed.Cir. 2004), cen. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1669
(2005) (emphasis in original).
19 I have been told that if the critic is technologically sophisticated enough, she may be
able to capture something called the "analog output" and transform that into a crisp digital
image. I do not have the technological expertise to evaluate this claim; what I do observe is that
many others similarly lack the expertise, but-if the law allowed-would be capable of using
decryption software such as DeCSS. Of course, the DMCA not only outlaws decryption; it also
outlaws making or selling decryption software. 17 U.S.C § I 201(a)(2) (anti-trafficking provision). See also Universal City Studios, Inc. v Corley, 273 F. 3d 429 at 442, 444 (2d Cir. 2001)
(enjoining the marketing of DeCSS as a device that "effectively controls access to a work").
20 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (NJ. 1984). For seminal exploration of the parallels between copyright's public domain and the physical public
domain of the environment, see generally the work of James Boyle, such as James Boyle, The
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LA w & CONTEMP. PROBS.
33 (2003); see also id. at 59 (discussing the public trust doctrine).
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righted computer programs as a necessary step to reaching the public
domain material. 21
Copyright courts have not gone as far as seaside courts, however.
At the seaside, the public may be entitled to an injunction that takes
down the fence, 22 while in copyright, fencing itself is usually considered lawful. The DMCA not only reinforces the private property
owner's privilege of fencing, but adds· to it a prohibition on even
climbing the fence.
Return to our imaginary seaside community. A critic like any other
member of the public can take the path through private property to get
to the beach. And if a homeowner fences off the path, the public may
well be entitled to an injunction that takes down the fence. 23 If the
fences have latched gates, people going to the beach may just be able
to unlatch them. If the fences are low enough to the ground, people
going to the beach can just step over them.
Assume, however, that in our community, some home owners start
complaining to city hall that the beach-going public is noisy, or nosy,
or perhaps that people peek annoyingly into the windows to free ride
on the home owners' pay-TV. So the community enacts something
like the DMCA: it validates fencing, and makes climbing over a fence
unlawful. And when the people who live a few blocks from the beach
complain that their historic rights of beach access are being eliminated, they are told, "Don't worry-once you get on the other side of
the fence you still will be protected by the public right-of-way; you
won't be a trespasser." But what good is that, if you're not allowed to
jump the fence without getting arrested?
To follow up the analogy, if the public path is fair use, and the
fence is encryption, the DMCA is the law that keeps you from practical access to the path. As digital distribution increases, the DMCA
will indeed increasingly threaten fair use.
The second purported cause of fair use's alleged demise is contract. Why is it thought that contract may kill fair use? It is because
much of the digital content we receive demands a click-through or
shrink-wrap consent prior to access. And the concern is that one of
21 See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir.
2000) (ruling that copying for reverse engineering was fair use); Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC
v. WIREdata, Inc. 350 F.3d 640, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that copying of a software
program to extract uncopyrighted data would be a fair use, and that "since [the plaintiff] has no
ownership or other legal interest in the data collected by the assessor, it has no legal ground for
making the acquisition of that data more costly .... ").
I am indebted to Professor Sag's useful discussion of the reverse engineering cases. Sag,
supra note 8, at 37-39.
22 State ex. rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
23 Id.
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the things the distributor can demand we "consent" to, in these licensing clicks, is waiver of our fair use rights. The legality of such waivers is still in dispute, both as a matter of state contract law and of preemption. Until definitively struck down (or if upheld), such asserted
waivers can discourage otherwise desirable fair uses.
So how do I respond? While fair use is in danger from the DMCA
and developments in contract law, I am not yet prepared to pronounce
fair use to be dead. I will come back to these claims later, but for
now, let us discuss the claims that the fair use doctrine is dangerous.
Regarding Congress, I concede that sometimes opponents to putting limits on copyright cite fair use as a reason why action is unnecessary. 24 But specific exemptions continue to be crafted and adopted
nevertheless; 25 no one imagines fair use can carry the burden alone.
Moreover, I cannot credit the suggestion that fair use caused the
breadth of current copyright. The legislative history that Jessica Litman and others reconstruct suggests no such neat causal tale. 26
I concede that the existence of fair use does permit entertainment
lobbies to pretend that the public has more protection than it really
has. 27 However, this danger is hardly as significant as the many public
choice difficulties identified by Professor Litman, 28 particularly imbalances in negotiating and lobbying power. Eliminating fair use
would eliminate the danger of its force being exaggerated-but it is

24 See, e.g., The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 12 (1999) (statement of Sen.
Ashcroft, Member, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("Some interested parties have suggested that
'fair use' is sufficient to take care of the problem of digital distance learning.").
25 See e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-122.
26 See generally Jessica Litman, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001). Rather than fair use substituting for what might have been particular exemptions, Professor Litman argues that "Congress
did not incorporate specific exemptions for the general population in most of these enactments
because nobody showed up to ask for them." Id. at 176.
Moreover, to the extent that fair use did play the role Professor Sag attributes to it, such a
history would only would reinforce the strength of positions like Professor Litman's that, "[T]he
1976 Act's structural expansiveness requires courts to interpret the statute's few limiting principles with concomitant expansiveness in order to preserve the balance that the statute seeks to
achieve." Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 895 n. 241 (1987).
27 See The Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. 30 (2004) (statement of Jack Valenti, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Motion Picture Association of America) ("So I'm saying to you, Mr. Chairman, fair use
is alive and well .... ").
2s See generally Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR.
L. REV. 19 ( 1996); Litman, supra note 26. See also Suzanne Scotch mer, The Political Economy
of Intellectual Property Treaties, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 415 (2004) (suggesting a pro-restraint
imbalance on the international front, resulting from structural considerations).
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bad strategy to strip one's self naked in an effort to look more pitiable.29
Regarding the purported dangers that the fair use doctrine poses to
judges, I simply disagree. It would be a shame if the courts got hung
up on 'transformation,' but I think that rubric will go the way of all
the other failed attempts at simplifying fair use, like the presumption
that commercial uses are unfair, 30 or the favoritism for plaintiffs
whose work is unpublished. 31
As we remember, the Supreme Court has ruled on the issue.
Whether fair use was available for exact 'unproductive' copying was
the primary point on which the Supreme Court disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit in Sony v. Universal City Studio32 back in 1984. The
Ninth Circuit had held that fair use could not extend to unproductive
copying 33 (in that instance, making an exact VCR copy of a copyrighted TV show). The Supreme Court reversed. 34 In Sony the Court
held that such copying could be fair use, and Sony has not been overruled.
Admittedly, the Court in a later fair use opinion, Acuff-Rose, emphasized the transformative nature of the defendant's parody. 35 However, that emphasis was deployed as part of the Court's effort to extricate itself from its earlier dicta that all commercial uses were presumptively unfair. 36 Acuff-Rose itself explicitly ratified Sony's rejection of a 'productivity' or 'transformativity' requirement. 37 Many postAcuff cases, like Nunez, 38 give fair use to nontransformative copies. 39
29 Not that Professor Tushnet and other defenders of free speech are calling for us to cast
away our clothes (or fair use) today, but it is worthwhile to examine where criticism of the
doctrine might lead.
30 The presumption arose in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984), and was evaded in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
31 When the cases began showing extreme deference to unpublished works, Congress responded by amending the statute to make clear that "The fact that a work is unpublished shall
not itself bar a finding of fair use .... " 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
32 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Professor
Tushnet treats the term "productivity" as simply "the older term" for "transformation''. Tushnet,
supra note 9, at 556.
3 3 Universal City Studios, Inc. v Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F 2d 963, 969-73 (9th Cir.
1982), rev'd by Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
34 Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
35 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (transformative works "lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space ....").
36 Id. at 583-84. Both transformation and commerciality relate to the first factor of the fair
use statute, the 'purpose and character of the use'. 17 U.S.C § 107(1) (2000).
37 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing to the portion of the Sony opinion, 464 U.S. 555 n.
40, that rejected the Ninth Circuit's "assump[tion] that the category of 'fair use' is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be 'productive."').
38 Nunez v. Caribbean Int'! News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (!st Cir. 2000).
39 A "nontransformative copy" is described by Professor Tushnet as a copy that is not
"critical and creative". Tushnet, supra note 9, at 537. Among the post-Acuff cases that award
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Admittedly, liability is sometimes imposed on the making of exact
copies; yet it is also true that liability is often imposed on the makers
of transformative works. 40 Both results flow from generally applicable principles,41 rather than from a rule disfavoring nontransformative works. 42
Professor Tushnet intimates that the fair use doctrine might be responsible for the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred to uphold the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono copyright term extension.43 She
seems to think that the Bono term extension would have fallen if the
judges could only have looked at the First Amendment squarely,
without the distraction of fair use. I think that is implausible. The
Bono term extension was a terrible incursion on the public interest,
but the copyright-First Amendment conundrum is simply
tough44-Professor Tushnet goes further and calls the conflict "in
large part irreconcilable" 45-and that is not the fault of fair use.

fair use treatment to non-creative copies are Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir.
2003); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4 111 Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 820 (2003); NewportMesa Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10290 (D. Cal. 2005);
Shell v. City of Radford, Virginia, 351 F. Supp. 2d 510 (W.D. Va. 2005); Duffy v. Penguin
Books USA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (S.D. N.Y. 1998); and Lucent Information Management,
Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 5 F.Supp.2d 238 (D.Del. 1998), afj'd on other grounds sub
nom, Lucent Info. Mgmt. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 186 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. Del. 1999).
40 As is often noted, the copyright owner's right over derivative works, 17 U.S.C § 106(2)
(2000), is a right to control transformati ve works based on the copyrighted expression.
41 Those general principles can best be found by looking at the ways that ordinary copyright markets fail to serve social goals. Professor Tushnet largely concedes that general market
failure principles could explain the transformative-use cases. Tushnet, supra note 9.
4 2 Professor Tushnet suggests that "plain old photocopying even in educational or scientific contexts, begins to look unfair". Tushnet, supra note 9, at 557; also see id. at 537. However, for that proposition she cites primarily Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs.,
99 F.3d 1381 (6111 Cir. 1996) (en bane) and Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2d
Cir. 1995). These are not "photocopying cases" per se. Rather, as with all fair use disputes, their
resolution depended on the interplay of a multitude of factors. Thus, the Texaco court noted,
"Our ruling is confined to the institutional, systematic, archival multiplication of copies," 60 F.
3d at 932, and the Michigan Document court emphasized the "systematic and premeditated
character [of the copying], its magnitude, its anthological content, and its commercial motivation", 99 F. 3d at 1390. The cases involved systematic behavior, in a profit-making context,
where the courts thought licensing was feasible, where there was no suggestion of censorship
motives, where privacy issues did not arise, and where the courts seem to have doubted that the
quantity of copying would be decreased by the need to pay a fee.
On the continued availability of fair use for photocopying, see Duffy v. Penguin Books
USA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (S.D. N. Y. 1998) (holding photocopying a fair use, citing Texaco).
4 3 Tushnet, supra note 9, at 561 (discussing the Court's treatment of the 1998 Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, 112 Stat. 2827).
44 For exploration of its difficulties, see Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright Norms and the
Problem of Private Censorship, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES, 67 at 72-78 (J. Griffiths & u. Suthersanen eds., 2005).
45 Tushnet, supra note 9, at 547.
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So I give a different interpretation to the cases she examines. Fair
use has not bifurcated copying and transformation as much as she
suggests. Not only do I think courts will continue to recognize some
plain copying as fair use, but I am optimistic that our courts will also
come to grips with the fact that all forms of copying can implicate the
First Amendment.
But what about the claim that fair use is dead? Ah, here is a bigger problem. Fair use is indeed ill, though hardly dead yet.
First, let us look at the threat posed to fair use by contract. I side
with those who say contractual waivers of fair use should be preempted, at least in the typical shrinkwrap context. (Fully negotiated
terms arrived at by a meeting of equal and engaged parties may be
different). My prediction is that over time, if such contracts become
so ubiquitous that they attach to virtually all copies, the result will be
so property-like that courts will subject the contracts to copyright
preemption.46 Similarly, states may interpret their own laws (or adopt
new ones) to avoid subjecting their citizens en masse to take-it-orleave-it waivers of important liberties. But that is largely guesswork. 47
Today's law tends to weigh against preemption,48 and today's contracts may indeed inhibit desirable and lawful fair uses.
The second threat to fair use, the DMCA, poses more immediate
dangers. Can the threat be surmounted by Congress or by judges applying the First Amendment? Given the history on botb counts, I am
not sanguine. 49
Yet ... not everything is digital yet. Until it is, there are many alternate paths to the beach, many ways to obtain access to copyrighted
and public domain works without stumbling over encryption or clicking through contracts. But digital delivery is increasingly dominant,
so we fans of fair use do need to fight for change in the DMCA and
an improvement in the law of contract preemption.
46 See Wendy J. Gordon. Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for
Contract, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998).
47 The guess nevertheless has some normative support. See 1-1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§
1.01 (criticizing the decision in Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.), cert
denied, 539 U.S. 928 (2003), for validating a license that prohibited a fair use); see also 1-3
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 3.04 (B)(3)(a).
48 Thus, despite the criticism to which the Bowers case has been subjected, see supra note
47, it was followed in Davidson & Associates v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1180
(E.D. Mo. 2004) (upholding a click-wrap waiver of reverse engineering, although "reverse
engineering as a fair use is firmly established") (citation omitted). The leading case on contract
preemption is probably ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a shrinkwrap contract that inhibited the use of public-domain material); but see Vault v.
Quaid, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding unenforceable a contract provision that prohibited
decompilation of a computer program).
49 See, e.g., United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D.Cal. 2002) (upholding the DMCA anti-marketing provisions against a First Amendment challenge).
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Let me close with an irony, comparing the posture of DMCA regarding fair use, with the posture of Grokster.
In the recent Grokster case now before the Suprerrie Court, 50 the
argument concerns secondary liability. The case proceeds on the assumption that some of the behavior facilitated by Grokster51 and
Streamcast52 is infringing. 53 The Ninth Circuit held that the peer-topeer programs were not liable for this ill-defined behavior because the
programs had substantial non-infringing uses, 54 and because the software did not give Grokster or Streamcast the ability to control what
users did with it. 55 The plaintiff copyright owners are basically arguing that Grokster or Strearncast could have included in their program
some way to control what its users did, 56 and should be held liable for
not doing so. That is, the plaintiffs essentially want the law to forbid
the marketing of new devices unless they are equipped to stop infringement. 57
The Grokster Ninth Circuit opinion appropriately held that such a
decision was for Congress, not the courts. 58 To illustrate why this
should be a Congressional, not a judicial, decision, think of the image
Randy Picker called forth, earlier in today's discussion, of the Star
Trek transporter. If installed in every home, such an invention could
allow thieves to transport toys and TVs off the Wal-Mart shelves at
their ease and without paying. But an instantaneous transporter also

50 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
686 (2004).
51 Grokster is a distributor of free file-sharing software. MGM Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at
1158. Grokster' s software allows users to share digital files, for example music and videos. Id.
Grokster' s software is characterized as a "peer-to-peer" network ("P2P"). In this article, I will
use the term "P2P" to denote software that enables a user's computer to access information
stored on other computers without a central index of available files.
52 Streamcast, like Grokster, distributes free file-sharing software that uses a P2P network.
Id. at 1159.
53 Id. at 1160 (noting that direct infringement by users was undisputed).
54 Id. at 1160-62.
55 Id. at 1162 (holding defendants not liable for contributory infringement because, inter
alia, the defendants receive notice of particular infringing conduct only at a time when they can
"'do nothing to facilitate, and cannot do anything to stop, the alleged infringement' of specific
copyrighted content") (citing the District Court's opinion at MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1037 (D. Cal. 2003); see also MGM Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 116366 (holding defendants not liable for vicarious infringement because, inter alia, the defendants
had "no ability to exclude individual participants", id. at 1165, and thus no ability to supervise).
56 Id. at 1165-1166 (''The district court correctly characterized the Copyright Owners' evidence of the right and ability to supervise as little more than a contention that 'the software itself
could be altered to prevent users from sharing copyrighted files.' Grokster I, 259 F.Supp.2d at
1045.").
57 There may be other alternatives as well.
58 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1167. The holding and tenor of the Grokster opinion largely followed the predictions made in Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies
of Dissemination, IOI COLUM. L.REV. 1613 (2001).
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would have immense and obvious legitimate uses. Copyright owners
asking the Grokster court to impose secondary liability resembles
Wal-Mart asking a property court to impose on the transporter's
manufacturer a liability for all the thefts accomplished through use of
the device-and, if injunctive relief is sought-prohibiting the transporter from being marketed at all until the makers could figure out
how to identify thieving uses and stop them. This could mean no
marketing of the marvelous transporter at all-hardly a typical judicial function.
But for our purposes, simply note the image: A potentially revolutionary device appears. 59 Then, property owners ask the judges to rule
that no such device be marketed unless its distributors are able to
identify and stop unlawful use. For peer-to-peer programs, this means
that the software would need to be made capable of distinguishing
infringing from noninfringing uses.
With that image in mind, let us turn to fair use and the DMCA, and
you will see what I call an irony.
Congress delegated power to the Copyright Office to identify
works that should be freed of DMCA circumvention restraints. 60 If
the Office in a rulemaking finds that the DMCA "adversely" threatens
the noninfringing use of any class or classes of works, it can create a
specific exemption benefiting the users of such works. 61 One of the
most interesting suggestions for the Copyright Office use of that
power was the proposal, from Jane Ginsburg, that the DMCA should
be inapplicable to any class of works for which the encrypting program fails to identify and allow access to public domain material. 62
59

Peer-to-peer sharing technology has significant potential to change the information
landscape. The Grokster court recognized advantages sounding in economics, cultural interchange, and civil liberties: "The technology has numerous other uses, significantly reducing the
distribution costs of public domain and permissively shared art and speech, as well as reducing
the centralized control of that distribution." Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 at 1164. See also Jessica
Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. I (2004 ).
60 17 U.S.C. § 120l(a)(l)(C) (2000). The delegation is actually to the Librarian of Congress, under whom the Register of Copyright serves. Id. at §70 I (a).
61 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a )(l)(C)-(E) (2000).
62 Letter via e-mail from Jane C. Ginsburg, Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and
Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School of Law, to David Carson, Esq., General
Counsel, United States Copyright Office (June I I, 2000) available at
http://www.copyright.gov/120 I/post-hearing/comments.html. Professor Ginsburg suggested
that:
the Copyright Office might include the following class of works among the classes
exempted from the application of§ 1201 (a):
Compilations and other works that consist of or incorporate works or materials in the public domain, unless the compilation or other work is
marked in such a way as to identify the public domain components,
thereby permitting the circumvention of any technological measure that
controls access to the public domain components.
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Dan Burk and Julie Cohen argued additionally that encryption should
be equipped in ways that allow fair users to get through the encryption barrier. 63 Thus, it was suggested that the law require, before a
copyright owner could take advantage of the DMCA anticircumvention provision, that he adopt encryption devices that made
it possible for fair users to get access, and for seekers of public domain material to obtain it even when it is bundled with copyrighted
material.
So here is the irony: copyright owners demand that all sharing
programs distinguish proper from improper use, and advocates for the
public domain demand that all encryption programs do the same.
Unfortunately, the Copyright Office has not followed the suggestion that fair uses or public domain portions of works be treated differently. Nor have courts asked to uphold fair use as a defense to the
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA agreed to do so. Further,
given the lobbying imbalance mentioned earlier, it is likely Congress
will also decline to amend the DMCA as requested. So no one is responding to the plea that the law demand fine-tuned technology in the
aid of fair use and the public domain. Yet the Grokster plaintiffs are
hoping for just such fine-tuned technology from the Supreme Court.
Let us hope the Court does not give it to them. If fine tuned technology isn't good for the goose, it should fare no better when the gander
demands it.
Fair use is not dead. Fair use is not a threat to its own goals. To
the contrary: overbroad contract rules and the DMCA are the true
threats. They threaten the culturally-viable practices that fair use has
historically sheltered. For fair use to serve its purposes, we need to do
more than keep it on the books. Our institutions must make it practical to employ.

Id.
63

Dan L. Burk & Julie Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 55 (2001) (proposing "modifications to the DMCA designed to
create incentives for the preservation of fair use in digital media").

